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INTRODUCTION
For the past two years there has been considerable speculation and
wonder concerning the constitutional status of police interrogation prac-
tices. Recently, four cases' concerning this issue, were reviewed on writ of
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. The Court's decisions
were consolidated into a single expansive opinion' which will materially
affect criminal law and procedure throughout the nation. So forceful is
the text of the opinion that even a cursory reading of the holding alone
will reveal the giant reach of its fingers:
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the au-
thorities and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against
self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be
employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective
means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and
to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously hon-
ored, the following measures are required. He must be warned
prior to any questioning that he has a right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney during the
interrogation, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
* Member of Editorial Board, University oj Miami Law Review.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, California
v. Stewart, - U.S. -, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
The decision was 5-4 in Miranda, Vignera, and Westover, Clark, J., Harlan, J., White, J.,
and Stewart, J., dissenting, and 6-3 in Stewart, Clark, J., concurring in the result, Harlan, J.,
White, J., and Stewart, J., dissenting. Chief Justice Warren wrote the opinion for the
majority.
2. The opinion alone covers over nineteen pages in U.S. Law Week, with separate
dissenting opinions by Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice White,
covering another fifteen pages. The wide reaching implications and complete meaning of
the decision cannot possibly be explored in an article of this type. For a perceptive analysis of
the subject in anticipation of the decision, see Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions
on Police Interrogation, 25 O11o ST. L.J. 449 (1964); Developments in the Law-
Confessions, 79 HARv. L. Rv. 935 (1966).
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be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation.ESl After such warnings have been
given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.'
In all four of the separate cases confessions or admissions made by
the defendant while in police custody were admitted into evidence at the
respective trial which resulted in his conviction. None had been advised
of his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent during police interroga-
tion, or of his right to have and consult with an attorney prior to the
interrogation. At the extremities, Ernesto Miranda5 confessed after only
two hours of interrogation, whereas Roy Allen Stewart6 confessed after
five days and nine interrogation sessions. Three7 of the four convictions
3. The Court explained earlier:
If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not
wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. Miranda v. Arizona,
supra note 1, at 1612. (Emphasis added.).
4. Id. at 1630. One week later the Court handed down Johnson v. New Jersey, - U.S.
-, 86 S.Ct. 1772 (1966), which held that neither Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), nor Miranda would apply retroactively, but that each case was applicable to cases
wherein the trial had begun after the respective decision dates, June 22, 1964 and June
13, 1966.
On the same day the Court revealed its decision in Schmerber v. California, - U.S.
-, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966), which deserves notation. The decision affirmed a conviction
for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor which was secured by admitting
into evidence at his trial the chemical analysis of a blood sample taken from the defendant
at a hospital where he was arrested after the auto accident in which he was involved.
The sample was taken at the direction of a police officer despite the defendant's refusal
to submit to the test on the advise of his attorney. The Court, in a 5-4 majority opinion
written by Justice Brennan rejected four constitutional arguments advanced by the
defendant. First, on the authority of Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), the Court
flatly rejected the defendant's contention that he had been denied due process. Next, the
opinion held that the defendant was not deprived of his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination because the privilege is not applicable to this type of non-communicative
compelled testimony or "compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real
or physical evidence.'" Third, he was not deprived of his right to counsel because he was
not entitled to assert the privilege, regardless that his attorney told him that he could.
Finally, he was not subjected to an unlawful search and seizure because, under the
circumstances, the invasion was not unreasonable nor was it conducted in an improper
manner.
The opinion employs various fictions to achieve a result which can only be justified
on the basis of practical considerations in accord with public policy. But in principle the
case is unsound. It is inconceivable that one who has been physically compelled to submit
to a blood test, the analysis of which resulted in his conviction of a crime when introduced
into evidence at his trial, had not been denied his privilege against self-incrimination.
Decisions such as this will only muddy the water once again.
5. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1. See note 7 infra.
6. California v. Stewart, supra note 1. See note 8 infra.
7. Ernesto Miranda was arrested and interrogated for two hours without being
advised of his right to keep silent or to consult with, and have an attorney present during
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were affirmed by the respective state's highest court; the fourth was re-
versed by the Supreme Court of California' on the basis of Escobedo v.
Illinois,9 because the record was silent as to whether the defendant had
ever been advised of his right to counsel or his right to remain silent. The
United States Supreme Court held that when the record is silent on the
question of whether the defendant has been apprised of his constitutional
rights, it will not be presumed that those rights were safeguarded, nor will
it be presumed that he made a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of those
rights.'" "The mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a
typed-in clause stating that he had 'full knowledge' of his 'legal rights,'
the interrogation which resulted in his written confession to kidnapping and rape. The
statement was admitted into evidence at trial, and his conviction was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Arizona, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721 (1965), which found no violation of
the defendant's constitutional rights. The Court reversed the conviction because failure
to give the required warnings rendered the statements inadmissible, regardless that he had
signed a statement which stated that he was fully aware of his rights. The Court would
not presume from such a record that the defendant made a "knowing and intelligent
waiver." Id. at 1636-37.
During questioning by a detective, Michael Vignera orally admitted to the robbery
for which he was picked up as a suspect. Later his statement was transcribed by a reporter
during questioning by an assistant district attorney. At trial, after the detective testified
to the oral confession, the court sustained the prosecution's objection to the question put
to the detective on cross-examination by the defense, relating to whether the defendant
had been advised of his right to counsel before interrogation. The transcribed admission
of guilt, which contained no warning to the defendant of his constitutional rights, was
also admitted into evidence. Both the Appellate Division, 21 App. Div. 2d 752, 252 N.Y.S.2d
19 (2d Dept. 1964), and the New York Court of Appeals, 15 N.Y.2d 970, 207 N.E.2d 527,
259 N.Y.S.2d 857, remittitur amended, 16 N.Y.2d 614, 209 N.E.2d 110, 261 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1965), affirmed the conviction without opinion. The Court reversed the conviction because
the defendant had not been "effectively apprised of his Fifth Amendment privilege or of
his right to have counsel present. . . ." Id. at 1537-38.
After being arrested by the Kansas City Police Department, and held for fourteen hours
during which time he was questioned by them without being advised of his constitutional
rights, Carl Westover confessed to two robbery charges during a subsequent FBI interrogation.
This time he had been warned that he could remain silent and was advised of his additional
:rights. The confessions were admitted into evidence at his trial at which he was found
guilty. The conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals, 342 F.2d 684
(9th Cir. 1965). The conviction was reversed by the Court because the defendant was not
given any warnings by local police prior to the FBI interrogation, and there was no
evidence that he "knowingly and intelligently waived" those rights prior to the time that
he made the statement. Id. at 1638-39.
8. Roy Allen Stewart, together with his wife and three others, was arrested at his home
by the Los Angeles police. With Stewart's consent, the police searched his home and found
items taken in robberies for which he was a suspect, including one robbery in which the
victim died from injuries sustained during commission of the crime. After five days and nine
interrogation sessions, during which he was alone with his interrogators, Stewart confessed
to robbing the deceased. Thereafter, the other four were released. He was convicted of
robbery and first degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California
reversed, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P.2d 97, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1965), because of a silent record
as to whether the defendant had ever been advised of his constitutional rights. The Court
affirmed because neither the safeguard of those rights nor a knowing and intelligent waiver
will be presumed from a silent record. The Court also felt that the defendant had been
compelled by the police to forego his privilege against self-incrimination through extensive
interrogation. Id. at 1639-40.
9. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
10. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 1640.
1966]
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does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relin-
quish constitutional rights.""
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
An accused's right to counsel has always been absolute in American
history, 2 but the meaning of the right was actually established during
the past thirty-four years. Powell v. Alabama, 8 in 1932, first expressed
the United States Supreme Court's distaste for convictions where the
defendant was without effective counsel. Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 14 a state court could not defeat an accused's right to be represented
by counsel,'" and at least in a capital case,' 6 the court was obligated,
regardless of a request,' 7 to assign "effective" counsel for an indigent
defendant sufficiently in advance of trial so that counsel had time for
consultation and preparation of the case.' 8 Yet, the true import of Powell
was its dicta which set forth the principles and the meaning of the right
to counsel. 9 Practically every major subsequent decision affecting the
right has been based on an interpretation of that dicta.20
11. Id. at 1637.
12. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
For an exhaustive study, see An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During
Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000 (1964); see also, BEANY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-12 (1955).
13. Ibid.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
.. .nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law....
15. An Alabama statute required the appointment of counsel for indigents in a
capital case. That right was defeated when, at arraignment, the accused was not asked
if he had, or was able to employ counsel. 287 U.S. 45, 52-53. Accord, Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961).
See also, Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) (A defendant in a state criminal
proceeding has an absolute right to the assistance of his own counsel.).
16. The right to counsel in a capital case existed even when the defendant pleaded
guilty. See Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471
(1945).
The Fourteenth Amendment didn't require appointment of counsel in non-capital
cases. See note 43 infra.
17. Specific representation was necessary, i.e., counsel that could be effective. 287 U.S.
at 71. Accord, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962) ("[I]t is settled that where
the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel
does not depend on a request."); see also McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (silence
is not a waiver of the right) ; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
18. Powell v. Alabama, supra note 12, at 68-71. But see, Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444 (1940) (appointment of counsel three days before trial was not a denial of due process).
19. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
[Diuring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings . .. that is to say,
from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when
consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important,
the defendants ...were as much entitled to the aid of counsel during that period
as at the trial itself. Id. at 57.
The fact that the right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied
without violating those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions. . . . Id. at 67.
[The] right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not corn-
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The admissibility in a state court of confessions or inculpatory state-
ments made by an accused during police interrogation and prior to arraign-
ment, was first considered by the United States Supreme Court in 1941, in
Lisenba v. California.21 In affirming22 a first degree murder conviction,
the majority felt that the illegal detention and delay before arraignment
by the police for purposes of interrogation and the denial of the defend-
ant's request to confer with his attorney were merely factors to be weighed
in determining Fourteenth Amendment due process23 voluntariness of the
confession. The Court was compelled to examine all the facts in the
record24 to determine the effect of the use of the confession on the "funda-
mental fairness"25 to the defendant.
Several cases26 had already crystallized the due process voluntariness
test under the Fourteenth Amendment for determining the admissibility
of confessions in state criminal trials. Brain v. United States27 reiterated
and slightly modified the common law rule that a confession made by an
accused while in police custody was admissible into evidence at his trial
as long as it was the product of his free and rational choice; i.e., it was
given freely and voluntarily, without threats, promises or inducements of
any sort.28 Although in Brain and some lower federal courts, voluntariness
prehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . .He lacks both
the skill and the knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
may have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. Id. at 68-69.
20. Powell has been cited approvingly and decisively in many landmark cases, while
its principles have been applied in numerous others. E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
21. 314 U.S. 219 (1941). For an excellent Note concerning the subject, see Right to
Counsel During Police Interrogation, 20 U. Muaa L. Rzv. 197 (1965).
22. Ibid. (Black, J. and Douglas, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 238.
Our duty, then, is to determine whether the evidence requires that we set aside
the finding . .. and adjudge the admissions of the confessions so fundamentally
unfair . . . as to amount to a taking of life without due process of law.
The Court rebuked state officials for their practices, but found the defendant's relative
"coolness," "self-possession" and reasonable intelligence, sufficient to override any unfairness
in those practices.
24. Id. at 240.
[Wihere a prisoner, held incommunicado, is subjected to questioning by officers
for long periods, and deprived of the advise of counsel, we shall scrutinize the
record with care to determine whether, by use of his confession he is deprived
of liberty or life through tyrannical or oppressive means.
25. Id. at 236. The "fundamental fairness" test was born.
As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a
denial of it we must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial;
the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.
26. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936).
27. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
28. Justice Frankfurter, in an exhaustive opinion, thoroughly stated the rule in
Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961):
Each of these factors [extensive interrogation, delay in arraignment or preliminary
hearing, failure to advise the accused of his rights, refusal to permit communication
1966]
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was said to be controlled by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination," this position may have been historically erroneous and
was not asserted in later cases.30 Nevertheless, the same standards were
consistently employed by the Court in establishing the due process volun-
tariness test applicable to confessions used in state courts." The rule
became part of the "fundamental fairness" doctrine developed in Lisenba,
which became the sole test of admissibility in state criminal trials.82
with friends and legal counsel at stages when the prisoner is still only a suspect],
in company with all the surrounding circumstances-the duration and conditions
of detention (if the confessor has been detained), the manifest attitude of the
police toward him, his physical and mental state, the diverse pressures which sap
or sustain his powers of resistance and self-control-is relevant. The ultimate
test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American
courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by the maker? If it is,
if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of
his confession offends due process. . . . The line of distinction is that at which
governing self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however
infused, propels or helps to propel the confession. (Emphasis added.)
29. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
In criminal trials, in courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether
a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that
portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."
30. See 3 Wioo.E EVIDENCE § 823 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, The Scope of Privilege
in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAS L. Rxv. 447, 453 (1938). The Court itself seemed to
doubt the relationship. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, supra note 26; Powers v. United
States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912).
Justice Harlan has consistently maintained that the privilege is not applicable outside
court proceedings and that Wigmore's historical analysis is correct. See his dissenting
opinions in both Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964), and in Miranda v. Arizona,
supra note 1, at 4542. (U.S. June 13, 1966), and Justice White's dissenting opinion at
4548. However, Justices Black and Douglas have never agreed with that position, maintaining
that the privilege is included within due process and most definitely involved in confession
cases. See their separate dissenting opinions in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947),
to which Justice Black attached an appendix containing his analysis of the Fifth Amend-
ment's history.
31. Confessions elicited by police (in the absence of counsel) have been held inadmissible,
and the convictions reversed, when the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the
statements were coerced according to due process standards. See Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503 (1963) (substantial coercion and inducement by actions and statements of
authorities--refused defendant opportunity to call his wife until he confessed); Columbe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 508 (1961) (prolonged and intermittent police interrogation-
defendant mentally retarded); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (defendant
near insanity) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (fraudulent tactics by questioning
officers) ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (fear of mob violence); Fikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (defendant disadvantaged by low mentality); Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (fraudulent tactics by interrogators); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49 (1949) (prolonged and persistent questioning) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)
(defendant disadvantaged by youth) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (threats
of violence); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) and Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S.
547 (1942) (prolonged and persistent questioning); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940) (threats of mob violence); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (actual
physical violence).
See also, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961) ; Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) ; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958);
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
32. See notes 23, 24, 25 supra.
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In 1958, the Court applied that test to Crooker v. California"8 and
Cicenia v. LaGay,34 and arrived at substantially the same result it had
reached in the earlier Lisenba decision. 5 Previously, the Court had ruled
that a confession made by an indigent defendant prior to state appoint-
ment of counsel was not inadmissible per se, because admissibility de-
pended on the totality of the circumstances. 36 Indeed, in the seventeen
years between Lisenba and these two later decisions the Court did little
more than refine the fundamental fairness test; to wit: into the rephrased
version--due process voluntariness.
But the circumstances presented in Spano v. New York17 required
reversal of a conviction based on a confession elicited from one already
indicted for murder. Although the Court applied the "facts and circum-
stances" test and held the confession involuntary, 8 four concurring
Justices39 felt that post-indictment police questioning was within the
course of judicial proceedings, and therefore, that the absence of counsel
33. 357 U.S. 433 (1958). Examination of the record did not reveal denial of due
process to a 31-year-old man who had attended one year of law school, by admitting into
evidence his voluntary confession, even though he had been denied a request to see his
attorney prior to his admission of the killing. Furthermore the court found that he had
not been denied due process, under the circumstances, because his preliminary hearing had
been intentionally delayed.
34. 357 U.S. 504 (1958). Again, application of the "fundamental fairness" test did
not warrant reversal because the accused had been denied his request to see his attorney
during the interrogation that elicited his confession. Such denial was only one factor to be
considered among all the facts in determining whether fundamental unfairness had been
worked.
35. It is interesting to note here that Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black and
Douglas dissented in both cases, whereas Justice Brennan dissented in Crooker but took no
part in Cicenia. Justices Black and Douglas had also dissented in Lisenba. See note 22 supra.
36. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1952) ; Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
37. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
38. Spano, a 25-year-old foreign-born with limited education, surrendered himself to
police on the advise of his attorney, after he had been indicted for murder. He was
interrogated for eight straight hours by several detectives and an assistant prosecutor,
until he confessed. He was repeatedly denied his request to see his attorney throughout
the interrogation. Under false pretenses he was induced into confessing by one officer
who had been friendly to him for years, through "sympathy falsely aroused." The court's
opinion felt the confession was unvoluntarily coerced, and distinguished Crooker and
Cicenia on the totality of the facts.
39. 360 U.S. 315, 324-326 (1959).
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Brennan, concurring:
But here we deal not with a suspect, but with a man who has been formally charged
with a crime. . . .This is a case of an accused, who is scheduled to be tried by a
judge and jury, being tried in a preliminary way by the police. This is a kangaroo
court procedure whereby the police produce the vital evidence in the form of a
confession which is useful or necessary to obtain a conviction. They in effect deny
him effective representation by council. This seems to me to be a flagrant violation
of the principle announced in Powell v. Alabama, supra, that the right to counsel
extends to the preparation for trial, as well as to the trial itself. Id. at 324-25.
(Emphasis added.)
Justice Stewart, joined in by Justices Brennan and Douglas, concurring:
[Ilt is my view that the absence of counsel when this confession was elicited was
alone enough to render it inadmissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 326
(Emphasis added.)
See also, note 19 supra.
1966]
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at that time was a sufficient denial of due process to render the statements
inadmissible.4"
In 1963 the Sixth Amendment 4' was made applicable to the States in
Gideon v. Wainwright.42 The Court overruled Betts v. Brady,43 which had
applied the "fundamental fairness" doctrine to determine an accused's
right to counsel, as a departure "from the sound wisdom upon which
the Court's holding in Powell v. Alabama rested."44 The Fourteenth
40. Id. at 324. The opinion referred to Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
[T]hat a conviction may [not] be sustained on the basis of other evidence if a
confession found to be involuntary by this Court was used, even though limiting
instructions were given. Id. at 324.
See also, Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (applicable only to the federal courts), had
clearly shown that the Sixth Amendment demands adherence to the principles set forth
in Powell. The right to counsel "is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed
necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty." Id. at 462. In a federal
criminal proceeding the trial court must protect that right for all defendants. The defendant
must be represented by counsel unless he intelligently and competently waives that right.
Otherwise (and regardless that it is a capital or non-capital case), the court must appoint
counsel for the defendant in order to maintain jurisdiction and proceed to conviction. Accord,
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) (failure to request plea of guilty is
not intelligent waiver).
See also, FED. R. Came. P. 4(b), 15(c), 44. (The Sixth Amendment is implemented
in federal prosecutions through these rules.).
42. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). There was no dissent. The court reversed a Florida conviction
in which the defendant had requested and been denied court appointed counsel, although
he was indigent. Florida law required court appointed counsel in capital cases only. The
major import of the decision was its application of the Sixth Amendment, for only four
states, Florida, Alabama, North Carolina, and South Carolina, did not already provide counsel
for indigents in all felony cases. Twenty-two states filed amicus curiae briefs asking that
Betts v. Brady, infra note 43, be overruled, for it was "an anachronism when handed down."
43. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The facts in Betts were remarkably similar to Gideon. The
defendant had likewise been refused court appointed counsel in a Maryland trial court for
a robbery charge. But the United States Supreme Court declined to reverse the conviction
because the majority felt that the concept of due process required by the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the specific guarantee of the Sixth Amendment,
but must depend instead, on appraisal of all the facts, and the "fundamental fairness"
to the defendant.
The phrase [due process of law] formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than
those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions in the Bill of Rights.
Its application is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal
of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute
a denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice, may,
in other circumstances and in the light of other considerations fall short of such
denial. Id. at 462. (Emphasis added.)
Prior to Gideon, "fundamental fairness" required appointed counsel in non-capital
cases only where the gravity of punishment for the crime, age and education of the defendant,
complicated by the nature of the offense and charge was so apt to result in injustice
without counsel. See Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959); Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S.
116 (1956); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437
(1948).
44. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). The Court relied heavily on the
principles set forth in Powell and Johnson v. Zerbst, supra.
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Amendment embraces the Sixth Amendment as "fundamental and essential
to a fair trial, '45 and requires appointment of counsel for an indigent
defendant in a state court as in a federal court, in all felony proceedings,"
and at all "critical stages" of a criminal prosecution.
One year after Gideon, the reasoning of Spano was ultimately adopted
by a majority of the court in Massiah v. United States.4 Incriminating
statements "deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and
in the absence of his counsel," deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amend-
ment "basic protections" and were, therefore, inadmissible at his trial.49
The trend was becoming clear; the right to counsel as idealized in
Powell was approaching reality.50
Still, the significance that the Fifth Amendment might have had
relative to police interrogation was not revealed in the cases." A careful
analysis of the situation indicates three probable reasons for this per-
culiarity. First, federal criminal proceedings are governed by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, of which, Rule 5 requires the "prompt
arraignment" of an accused in order to insure that he will be apprised
of his right to counsel, or appointment thereof if he is indigent, and
informed of his other rights including his constitutional privilege to remain
silent. 2 When there has been an unnecessary delay" in arraigning the
45. Id. at 342. Betts had said the ". . . appointment of counsel is not a fundamental
right, essential to a fair trial." (Emphasis added.) 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
46. Id. at 339-340. See also FED. R. Cam. P. 44, note 41 supra.
47. Id. at 344-345. The opinion here quoted Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 68-69
(1932), note 12 supra.
The absence of counsel at a "critical st ge" prior to the trial of one entitled to counsel
prejudicially deprived the defendant of his constitutional right. See White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
48. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The defendant, while out on bail
after indictment, made certain incriminating statements to his accomplice, who had secretly
agreed to cooperate with federal agents. An automobile was "bugged" to transmit by
radio, conversations between himself and this accomplice (also co-defendant), to an
agent out of the defendant's sight and without his knowledge. Over objection, the agent's
testimony was admitted at the defendant's trial. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, holding that use of the statements so obtained alter indictment and in the
absence of the dejendant's attorney, violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right
to the "Assistance of Counsel." The Court felt that the post-indictment stage is within
the period of judicial proceedings.
49. Id. at 206.
50. The Court rested its decision significantly on the principles set forth in Spano
and Powel, quoting profusely from each; that the right to counsel contemplates the oppor-
tunity for effective representation.
51. See notes 30, 31 supra, and accompanying text.
52. FED. R. Cnme. P. 5.
53. "Without unnecessary delay" under FEn. R. Cram. P. 5, means that he may be
booked by police,
But he is not to be taken to police headquarters in order to carry out a process
of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements
to support the arrest and ultimately his guilt. Malloy v. United States, 354 U.S.
449, 454 (1957).
The rule is not applicable to the States. See Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
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accused, the McNabb-Mallory54 rule renders any incriminating state-
ments made by him prior to such an arraignment inadmissible per se.
As a result of this procedure, the Court never had to squarely face and
decide the issue of the existence of a Fifth Amendment privilege to
remain silent during interrogation.
Second, the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to the states55 and
a majority of the Court repeatedly found no need to employ it in terms
because the Fourteenth Amendment standards of due process voluntari-
ness, when applied to the accused's statement, seemed to adequately
encompass the privilege. 56 Finally, as noted earlier,57 many authorities
felt that the privilege against self-incrimination was applicable only to
prevent compelled testimony at formal court proceedings, or the like,
and historically had no place in police interrogation.
But progress in the formulation, indeed, the application of constitu-
tional justice would not be barred by mere historical conflict. In 1964, a
5-4 majority 8 of the United States Supreme Court decided two cases, a
week apart, which form the basis of the Miranda decision. Taken together,
Malloy v. Hogan59 and Escobedo v. Illinois"° might well epitomize the
instant opinion as would an artist's sketch resemble his finished painting."
Malloy incorporated62 the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
54. Malloy v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), and McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1942).
[Tihe McNabb rule [is] that a confession is inadmissible if made during illegal
detention due to failure promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate,
whether or not the "confession is the result of torture, physical or psychological ......
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 413 (1948).
55. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Accord, Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947).
Adamson was a 5-4 decision in which Justices Black and Douglas strongly dissented.
Justice Black asserted that the Amendment's history displayed that it was so entwined
in due process so as to be a natural part of it.
56. See cases cited note 31 supra, and accompanying text.
57. See note 30 supra, and accompanying text. See also, 8 WiGMoRE, EvinExcE,
§ 2266 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
58. In both cases Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and
Goldberg, made up the majority. The same four Justices who constituted the dissent in
Miranda also dissented in Malloy and Escobedo: Justices Clark, Harlan, White and Stewart.
59. 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (overruling Twining v. New Jersey and Adamson v. California,
supra note 55).
60. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). After being denied several requests to see his lawyer during
intensive police interrogation, Danny Escobedo, a 22-year-old Mexican-American of limited
education, was coerced into making inculpatory statements which connected him with a
murder for which he was not yet formally charged. The statements were admitted into
evidence, over his objection, at the trial which resulted in his conviction.
61. The same cases cited, together with the arguments propounded in Malloy and
Escobedo, by both the majority and the dissenters, are also set forth and blended into the
Miranda opinion.
62. The "incorporation doctrine" of absorbing the fundamental rights in the first
eight amendments of the United States Constitution into the Fourteenth Amendment,
thereby making them applicable to the states, is an interesting adventure of its own,
and is not without substantial resistance. See Justice Goldbergs' concurring opinion in
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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incrimination into the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby obligated the
states to take cognizance of the privilege and its federal constitutional
implications. The opinion by Justice Brennan stated that the due process
confession cases63 recognized:
[T]hat the American system of criminal prosecution is accusa-
torial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege
is its essential mainstay.... The Fourteenth Amendment secures
against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amend-
ment guarantees against federal infringement-the right of a
person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfet-
tered exercise of his own will .... 11
The forceful inference in Malloy that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion applied to police interrogation permeated Justice Goldberg's entire
opinion in Escobedo.66 But even more significant is that the decision in
Escobedo rested on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel which was held
to attach whenever the investigation focused on an accused, impliedly in
order to protect his Fifth Amendment privilege and thereby effectuate the
right to counsel at trial.66 A rule less effective "would make the trial no
more than an appeal from the interrogation, and the 'right to use counsel
at the former trial [would be] a very hollow thing [if], for all practical
purposes, the conviction is already assured by pre-trial examination.' "67
63. See note 31 supra.
64. 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964). (Emphasis added.) This passage is quoted in part in Miranda
v. Arizona, - U.S. -, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1620 (1966).
Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, noted that none of the due process confession
cases, supra note 31, ever made reference to the Fifth Amendment, although he admitted
that they do "carry an implication that coercion to incriminate oneself, even when under the
forms of law ... is inconsistent with due process." Id. at 15-16 n.i. See also, Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
Also worth noting is Justice White's comment in his dissenting opinion in Escobedo
v. Illinois, infra note 65, at 499. "The failure to inform an accused that he need not answer
and that his answers may be used against him is very relevant indeed to whether the
disclosures are compelled."
65. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
At the time of his arrest and throughout the course of the interrogation, the police
told petitioner that they had convincing evidence that he had fired the fatal shots.
Without informing him of his absolute right to remain silent in the face of this
accusation; the police urged him to make a statement, Id. at 485. (Emphasis added.)
Petitioner, a layman, was undoubtedly unaware that under Illinois law an
admission of mere complicity was legally as damaging as an admission of firing
the fatal shots .... The "guiding hand of counsel" was essential to advise petitioner
of his rights in this delicate situation. Id. at 486.
66. Most subsequent cases in state courts, and in many federal courts, have disregarded
the force of Escobedo as it was intended by the court, through interpretation of the case
as limiting itself to the circumstances and facts therein: a specific denial of request to see
one's lawyer and failure of the police to warn the accused of his right to silence while in
police custody. The last sentence of the opinion says that, ". . . under the circumstances here,
the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." 378 U.S. 487, 492 (1964).
(Emphasis added.) See, e.g., United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965);
United States v. Cone, 354 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1965); Thompson v. Cox, 352 F.2d 488
(10th Cir. 1965); Montgomery v. State, 176 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1965); Mefford v. State,
235 Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824 (1964) ; People v. Agar, 44 Misc. 2d 396, 253 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1964);
State v. McLeod, I Ohio St. 60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964).
67. Id. at 487.
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We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect
has requested and has been denied an opportunity to consult
with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him
of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused
has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the
Sixth Amendment... and that no statement elicited by the police
during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal
trial. 68
III. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
In Miranda the Court rested its decision squarely on the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, emphasizing the ne-
cessity for providing "proper safeguards" to protect the right. "The
presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary
to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the
privilege ... [in order to effectuate] the protection of rights at trial." 69
This it said, was actually the purpose of the Escobedo decision.
The presence of an attorney, and the warnings delivered to the
individual, enable the defendant under otherwise compelling cir-
cumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a
way that eliminates the evils in the interrogation process. With-
out the protections flowing from adequate warnings and the
rights of counsel, "all the careful safeguards erected around the
giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any other wit-
ness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the
most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would
have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the
police." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961).70
The impetus behind the decision is clearly the Court's distrust for
police interrogation methods. Emphasizing that interrogation takes place
This was the "stage when legal aid and advice" were most critical to petitioner.(citing Massiah v. United States). It was a stage surely as critical as was the
arraignment in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, and the preliminary hearing
in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59. What happened at this interrogation could
certainly "affect the whole trial, . .." since rights "may be as irretrievably lost,
if not then and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented by counsel
waives a right for strategic purposes." ...
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, we held that every person accused
of a crime, whether state or federal, is entitled to a lawyer at trial. The rule
sought by the State here, however, would make the trial no more than an appeal
from the interrogation; and the "right to use counsel at the formal trial [would be]
a very hollow thing [if1, for all practical purposes, the conviction is already
assured by pre-trial examination." Id. at 486-487. (Emphasis added.)
68. Id. at 490-91. (Emphasis added.)
69. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 64, at 1623.
70. Id. at 1624. (Emphasis added.)
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in secrecy which "results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact
goes on in the interrogation rooms," 7' the opinion utilizes various police
manuals 72 to demonstrate that modern methods are psychologically de-
signed to "persuade, trick, or cajole [the accused] out of exercising his
constitutional rights.173 Concluding that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is "the essential mainstay of our adversary
system, ' 74 the Court is forced to accept such inherently coercive methods
as a violation of the absolute right to remain silent.
We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege
apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement of-
ficers during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from
familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antag-
onistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion
described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the
isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than
in courts or other official investigations, where there are often
impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery. 75
For these reasons the Court asserted that the warning to one about
to be interrogated was essential to assure his knowledge of the right to
remain silent-"the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to
its exercise.176 But:
More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in
overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmo-
sphere....
71. Id. at 1614. The Court's concern over such secret police interrogation practices
is not a new one. See, e.g., Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
72. E.g., INBAU & REI, C~rMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962); O'HARA,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1959); see also, GERR & SCHROEDER,
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION (1962).
Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psycho-
logically rather than physically oriented .... The officers are told by the manuals
that the "principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is
privacy-being alone with the person under interrogation." Miranda, supra note
64, at 1614.
The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact. The interrogator should direct
his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than
to court failure by asking the subject whether he did it. Id. at 1615.
[T]he setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear.
In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction
and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt
undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the
police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless
questioning, are employed .... When normal procedures fail to produce the needed
result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal
advise. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading
on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police then persuade,
trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights. Id. at 1617.
73. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 64, at 1617.
74. Id. at 1620.
75. Ibid.
76. Id. at 1624.
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The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation
can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made
aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to
have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system
we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's
right to choose between silence and speech remains unjettered
throughout the interrogation process....
Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interroga-
tion must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult
with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interroga-
tion.... As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and
that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this
warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount
of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware
of this right will suffice to stand in its stead.77
Finally, recognizing the settled rule that "the right to be furnished
counsel does not depend on a request, s78 the Court stated:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is
clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time
prior to or during the questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease.7" At this point he has shown
that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any
statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot
be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and
his right to retained or appointed counsel 0
Logically, "a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the
silence of the accused after warnings are given,"'" or from a silent record,
when there has been a confession. Furthermore, "there is no room for
the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some
questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his
right to remain silent when interrogated.)8 2
77. Id. at 1624-26. (Emphasis added.)
78. Id. at 1626 (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962)).
79. The opinion said here by footnote:
If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an attorney present,
there may be some circumstances in which further questioning would be permissible.
In the absence of evidence of overbearing, statements then made in the presence
of counsel might be free of the compelling influence of the interrogation process
and might fairly be construed as a waiver of the privilege for purposes of these
statements. id. at 1627-28 n.44.





It makes no difference whether the statements made by an accused
were "direct confessions" or "admissions," inculpatory or exculpatory,
because in the absence of proper warnings or a valid waiver "no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him."83
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual
from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it
does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. 4
In retrospect, Miranda clarifies the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination together with its Knight Protectorate, the Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Under our accusatorial
system, the privilege is a person's absolute right which cannot be defeated.
It is the essential guarantee of his freedom of choice to speak or remain
silent in the face of criminal investigation. It insures that his accusors can-
not coerce from him incriminating communications of any sort. The privi-
lege attaches immediately whenever the legal authorities intentionally
place an individual in jeopardy of incriminating himself, and every device
must then be employed to protect the opportunity for its free exercise or
intelligent waiver. The concept of constitutional justice implores that in
order to effectively protect his privilege, the accused be entitled to the
assistance of counsel familiar with the law, i.e., an attorney who can
fully comprehend the total implication and propriety of the exercise or
the waiver of that privilege. Therefore, the "new" right is double-barreled:
American standards of criminal justice demand that whenever an indi-
vidual may constitutionally invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel
should automatically spring to the forefront so as to effectively safeguard
his constitutional guaranty.
Justice Clark found himself "unable to join the majority because its
opinion goes too far on too little, while my dissenting brethren do not go
quite far enough.""5 His primary concern is with the new exclusionary rule
which "requires inexorably the exclusion of any statement by the accused,
as well as the fruits thereof," should the police fail to follow the procedures
outlined in the opinion as prerequisite. "Such a strict constitutional
specific inserted at the nerve center of crime detection may well kill the
patient.""8 Moreover, none of the police manuals, or the practices set
forth therein and referred to by the majority, appear in the record of the
decided cases, and there is no reason to assume, therefore, that custodial
interrogation is coercive per se. The Justice would not apply the Fifth
83. Id. at 1629-30. See also, note 108 infra and accompanying text.
84. Id. at 1629.
The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support
a conviction .. .but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute. . . .Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S.
479, 486 (1951).
85. Id. at 1640-41.
86. Ibid.
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Amendment privilege so "arbitrarily," rather "In the absence of warnings,
the burden would be on the State to prove that counsel was knowingly
and intelligently waived or that in the totality of the circumstances,
including the failure to give the necessary warnings, the confession was
clearly voluntary." 7
In two separate opinions by Justices Harlan and White (each joined
in by the other and Justice Stewart), the remaining three dissenters solidly
opposed the majority's application of the Fifth Amendment to police
interrogation, finding neither historical or case precedent as a basis for
the decision. They are severely concerned that the new procedural require-
ments will totally emasculate a most valuable tool for criminal investiga-
tion and return more confessed criminals to society than can be justified,
especially without more proof (other than the police manuals) that police
interrogation is as inherently coercive as the majority describes. Justice
Harlan points out that of the twenty-seven states plus the United States
who joined the three party-states as amicus curiae, "No State in the
country has urged this Court to impose the newly announced rules, nor
has any State chosen to go nearly so far on its own."88 These dissenters
can find no reason in logic or law for abandoning the due process voluntary
confession rule in its contemporary and sophisticated form; they would
continue to apply that test to the facts of each case.
IV. ANTICIPATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Now that the due process voluntary confession rule has been over-
ruled future decisions on the admissibility issue will most likely focus on
three areas: (1) whether there was a valid waiver of rights prior to the
making of the statements; (2) whether the accused's freedom was suffi-
ciently restrained at the time he made the statement; (3) whether evidence
uncovered through some violation of the accused's rights was properly
admitted or excluded."9 Moreover, what are the "outer limits" of the
Fifth Amendment privilege?
A. Valid Waiver
The Court in Miranda set forth the proposition announced in previous
cases,90 that one may waive his privilege against self-incrimination or his
right to counsel, but that he can only do so "knowingly and intelligently."
The prosecution must now assume the burden of establishing such a
waiver before the statements may be admitted into evidence. Further-
more, a waiver may be cut off or withdrawn.9'
87. Id. at 1642-43. (Emphasis added.)
88. Id. at 1652.
89. See Justice White's dissenting opinion, Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 64, at
1664.
90. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n.14 (1964).
91. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 64.
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There can be no waiver until the accused has knowledge of the right
or privilege and an opportunity to exercise it. The Court declared that this
required knowledge cannot be presumed because only if he has actually
been told of his rights can there be any assurance that he was aware of
them. Because the existence of the right is independent of any request,
a fortiori no request is necessary. For the same reasons, unless an accused
knows of his rights he cannot intelligently waive them. Therefore, the
record must reflect that he was actually apprised of his rights before the
court can even reach the waiver issue. 2
The problem of waiver will invariably arise whenever the prosecution
attempts to place into evidence statements made by an accused to the
police in the absence of counsel. If the statements were taken during a
transcribed interrogation session, the record will provide the court with
adequate information in order to evaluate admissibility requirements.
But otherwise, what will be sufficient corroboration to demonstrate a
valid waiver? What factors go into making up a valid waiver? Are those
factors different for waiver of the privilege than for waiver of counsel?
The well defined body of case law applicable to waiver in the field of
search and seizure will undoubtedly prove helpful as a guideline. An
individual may waive his right to require the police to first obtain a
warrant, by either inviting or consenting in fact to the search. However,
coercion cannot be used to gain such consent, and it may be presumed if
an officer demands or even requests admittance under color of authority."
The presumption against waiver of constitutional rights requires "clear
and convincing" proof that consent was freely and intelligently given.94
Thus, "waiver" while in custody, despite the lack of apparent pressure,
may not be considered as freely or intelligently given under some circum-
stances because of the show of force and the superior authority which
Justice Clark in his dissenting opinion, made the following statement after stating
the new waiver rule:
To require all those things at one gulp should cause the Court to choke over
more cases than Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) and Cicenia v. LaGay,
357 U.S. 504 (1958), which it expressly overrules today. Id. at 1642.
92. Id. at 1626-28.
Applying the same reasoning to Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 90, explains the state-
ment therein that the defendant had not waived his right to silence. Because he had not
been actually warned it cannot be presumed that he effectively knew of his privilege to
silence even though his attorney had once told him to say nothing and later motioned an
admonition to silence. It cannot be inferred that he understood what had been communicated
to him and, therefore, he could not have intelligently waived the privilege. See also, Brock
v. United States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955), noted in 34 TExAs L. REv. 472 (1956),
1956 WAsH. U.L.Q. 127.
The new waiver standard illustrates by definition, demolition of the voluntary con-
fession rule; an involuntary waiver can hardly be imagined.
93. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
94. Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Wion v. United States,
325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Channel
v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649
(D.C. Cir. 1951).
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the police are able to display."5 The "false bravado" test96 may often be
applied to test the validity of the waiver when such coercion is indicated,
although the record clearly reflects that the accused had knowledge of
his rights. Moreover, consent cannot be obtained through subterfuge. 97
Assuming then, that the accused had been advised of his rights as
required, the remaining issue is whether he had intelligently waived them
before he spoke. One argument can be made 8 that a layman cannot
intelligently waive his privilege against self-incrimination. Before a person
can intelligently waive the privilege he must understand the implication
of his statement, and whether the communication would be incriminating
implies a knowledge of the law.9 Matching a highly skilled interrogator,
or assistant prosecuting attorney up against a layman who has "waived"
his right to have an attorney present is really no contest. It could be said,
therefore, that it is only counsel for the accused who can intelligently
initiate the waiver of the privilege. A fortiori, how can a layman intelli-
gently waive his right to counsel?
But this result goes too far. Most courts have held that after a
warning by police regarding the right to silence a confession given was
a valid "knowing" waiver of the privilege.'00 "However, the burden must
be on the state to establish that in fact the defendant already had full
knowledge of his rights; that he understood that an attempt to exercise
them would not be thwarted or penalized; and that with such knowledge
he acted entirely voluntarily."'' Admissibility then, will obviously rest
largely on an examination of the facts and circumstances to determine the
voluntariness of the statement.
The giving of warnings should not of itself prevent the obtaining
of a confession; this has been the experience of the FBI and other
law enforcement agencies.0 2 Having an attorney present during the
95. See Channel v. United States, supra note 94; Canida v. United States, 250 F.2d
822 (5th Cir. 1958).
96. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
Conceivably, that is the calm statement of an innocent man; conceivably, again,
it is but the false bravado of a small-time criminal. But, however it be charac-
terized it hardly establishes willing agreement that the officers search the house-
hold without first procuring a warrant. Comparable statements have been held
insufficient where the victim of the search was safely in his home, his place of
business, or in his automobile.
97. See Gatewood v. United States, 209 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
98. See People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
99. See notes 65, 67 supra, and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Latham v. Crouse, 338 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1954).
101. White v. Hancock, 355 F.2d 262, 263 (1st Cir. 1966). Cf., cases cited note 98 supra.
102. See Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 Omo
ST. L.J. 449, 475 & nn.157, 158 (1964).
The Court in Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 64, at 1632, noted that the FBI "has
compiled an exemplary record of effective law enforcement" although suspects are advised
of their rights before any interrogation.
It is worth noting, however, that one reason for the FBI's effectiveness as opposed
[VOL. XX
COMMENTS
interrogation questioning, however, is obviously another matter. The now
famous statement of Justice Jackson amply illustrates the point: "[A] ny
lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no
statement to police under any circumstances.' 103 Nevertheless, in most
cases the accused will not assert his right to have an attorney present
because he will not want the police to infer that he has something to hide
or that he may be guilty and that he needs his attorney to protect him. On
the other hand, this may be one area in which the "false bravado" test
should be applied in order to establish whether or not the accused really
waived his right to have an attorney present.
B. Sufficient Restraint
The waiver question may extend into yet another area: whether one's
freedom was sufficiently restrained to have required an apprisal of his
constitutional rights at the time certain incriminating statements were
made, or which led to other incriminating evidence. Of course Miranda
recognized that, "General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding
a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process
is not affected by our holding." 04 But when is one's freedom sufficiently
restrained?
The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is
in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police
without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can
be interrogated. . . . Volunteered statements of any kind are
not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility
is not affected by our holding today.10 5
Obviously, the Court's interpretation of the time at which the privilege
attaches was intended to be liberal.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom oj action in any significant
way. 06
to that of the local police is that the FBI "builds" the case against a suspect before making
the arrest. The method of operation used by the FBI is to accumulate as much evidence
as possible while keeping the suspect under surveillance, and then to move in when enough
evidence to prosecute is secured. This makes it unnecessary to interrogate the accused in
most cases. But quite often the FBI is able to operate this way because of the local police,
who are usually relied on to "keep tabs" on the suspect as he moves around, or who pick
up the accused at various times to question him, the fruits of which are given to the FBI.
Furthermore, most federal cases, other than kidnapping, have not required interrogation
of the suspect to secure the information needed, whereas most offenses with which local
police are responsible often require interrogation to get leads, etc. Finally, the resources
with which the FBI has to work are far more extensive than what is available to local police.
103. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949).
104. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 64, at 1629.
105. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
106. Id. at 1612. (Emphasis added.)
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In essence, with these limits as a guide, the issue must be resolved on
particular facts and circumstances first put to the trial judge, and
ultimately determined by a jury. But noteworthy, is the Court's reference
after the above quote, that, "This is what we meant in Escobedo when
we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused." '
C. The "New" Exclusionary Rule
The third area of anticipated conflict arises from the following
statement by the Court:
But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated
by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him."'
The problem then, centers on the full meaning of the Court's language,
which is couched in very absolute terms. 9 If, in fact, all evidence is to
be excluded per se, then the Court will have created a new rule of
admission and exclusion in the field of constitutional law which reaches
beyond comparable rulings. Even on the basis of the vitality of the right
involved such an all-inclusive rule would be difficult to explain."'
Under due process standards an involuntary confession could not
constitutionally support a conviction, even in part, and regardless that the
record revealed sufficient additional evidence to support it."' Most
likely, then, the new exclusionary rule will be applied analogously to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, 2 which is sometimes referred to
as the "fruits of the poisonous tree ' " 8 doctrine, and which excludes
any evidence uncovered as the result of an illegal search or seizure. This
position seems tenable because of the similarity of the terms used to
designate the two rules, and further because of the often recognized
compatibility of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." 4
107. Id. at 1612 n.4.
108. Id. at 1630. (Emphasis added.)
109. It is worth noting that in many states an accused's silence after a direct accusation
has been admissible into evidence. See 4 WIGMoRE, EVmENCE §§ 1071-1072 (3d ed. 1940).
In Miranda the Court made it clear that such attempts violated the defendant's constitu-
tional rights.
In accord with this decision, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exer-
cising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interroga-
tion. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute
or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation. Id. at 1625, n.37.
110. It is interesting to note that such an operation of the rule is the primary fear
of the dissenting Justices. See supra note 89, and accompanying text.
111. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961); Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401, 404 (1945). See also, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Haynes v. Wash-
ington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). See note 40 supra.
112. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
113. The phrase stems from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
114. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, - U.S. -, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966).
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Although the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is almost
uniformly applied to exclude evidence from the trial of the accused
which was uncovered as a result of a violation by the police of his con-
stitutional rights, at least two exceptions are applied whenever justified
by the circumstances. The evidence may be held admissible when its
discovery is so unrelated to the illegal search "as to dissipate the taint,"" 5
or if the prosecution can demonstrate that it would have been uncovered
anyway.11
6
However, because these exceptions are vague, to say the least, a
better rule has been suggested: a "but for" test which would exclude
any evidence which the police would not have obtained but for their
constitutional violation." 7 This test would effectively safeguard the
defendant's constitutional rights, but would practicably permit the
introduction of evidence which could be used without the danger of
infringing his rights.
The new exclusionary rule will not entirely protect those individuals
who are subjected to police harassment, or those "picked-up" as mere
suspects for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
evidence for a charge. Such arrests have also been utilized to provide an
opportunity for the prosecutor to extract evidence from an accused in
order to perfect his case, or to elicit a confession, 118 and could conceivably
continue as long as the proper warnings and safeguards are employed.
Similarly, one case in recent years declared that a voluntary confession
following an illegal arrest was not invalid per se," 9 and presumably
Miranda will not change that rule, providing, however, that adequate
warnings are given and that a valid waiver can be demonstrated. Because
of the decision, state legislatures will probably establish directives that
should make such police practices too burdensome for the most part.
It is clear that henceforth the police must necessarily be more
sophisticated in the exercise of their duties. They must be cautious, lest
their field investigation so center on a person as to amount to a restraint
of his freedom, at which time he would become entitled to proper warnings
should the officer wish to constitutionally assure the admissibility of his
information. And because the new requirements for constitutional safe-
guards could materially affect undercover work, whenever the investiga-
115. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
116. See Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 926 (1952).
117. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 Haav. L. Rv. 938, 1025 (1966).
Cf., Coplon v. United States, supra note 116.
118. See Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel.
Basic Problems & Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 CoL. L. REv. 62, 69 (1966); Karnisar,
Illegal Searches of Seizures & Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements, 1961 U. ILL.
L.F. 78, 122 n.201.
119. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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tion begins to focus on the accused, investigating officers must exercise
judgment in their manner and methods to prevent encroachment of the
suspect's constitutional rights, and thereby render useless the fruits of
their efforts. Admittedly, a value judgment at best, might raise the issue
whether a person's freedom had been restrained.
We agree that the interviewing agent must exercise his judgment
in determining whether the individual waives his right to
counsel. Because of the constitutional basis of the right, how-
ever, the standard for waiver is necessarily high. 2 '
At the same time, police investigation to secure extrinsic evidence
will now become more vital to successful prosecution. In view of the
warning and waiver requirements, prosecuting attorneys will seek to avoid,
wherever possible, the heavier burden of demonstrating a "knowing and
intelligent" waiver. Police departments, as well, are very concerned with
the arrest-conviction rate which is often used to gauge their efficiency.
But, ineffective law enforcement cannot be tolerated, whatever the reason.
All this points to the greater financial expense involved-the dollar
and cents increase which society will have to bear for modern effective
law enforcement. Our policemen will have to be more capable and com-
petent, more highly trained, and consequently better paid.' 21 Additional
technological devices for better crime detection will be needed to fill in
the gap caused by the loss of the confession as a device. More detailed
police procedures will require expanded administration facilities. A larger
and more effective public defender agency is inevitable. Finally, a new
form of "deposition" recording of interrogation sessions will most certainly
be required.
D. Bugging Devices or "Here We Go Again"
Before leaving this area, the question may be posed how one's
constitutional right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination will
be affected by police undercover work through the use of wire-tapping
or other secret "bugging" devices used to secure information from a
suspect by listening to his private conversations. It could be argued that
by analogy to Massiah, Brock v. United States, 2' and other search and
120. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 64, at 1634, n.55.
121. Several states have already enacted minimum law enforcement training standards
for policemen in recognition of the need for more qualified officers. Furthermore, academic
training in police science and administration is presently being offered by some forty insti-
tutions of higher learning, e.g., Washington State University, UCLA, and Michigan State
University. The problems and suggestions are commendably approached by LEONARD, PoxIaC
ORGArZATION & MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 1964), and WILsoN, POLICE ADMINISTRATION (2d
ed. 1963).
122. 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955).
After arresting three men at a moonshine still, federal agents then proceeded to a
nearby house to find a fourth man, Brock. Through an open window in the house in which
Brock was sleeping, the agents propounded suggestive questions to him after they noticed
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seizure cases which have discussed the Fifth Amendment influence, any
evidence obtained from such secret investigations was obtained illegally,
in violation of the suspect's constitutional rights. If the privilege, and
therefore, the right to counsel, attaches whenever the investigation
centers on the accused, or whenever the authorities actively place him in
a position whereby incriminating statements could be elicited from
him, then that point should be reached whenever the police utilize their
secret listening devices to uncover incriminating evidence from the
suspect's communications.
It has been the law for some time that exploratory and general
searches to find incriminating evidence are unconstitutional, and that
private papers introduced to demonstrate evidence of a crime violate the
Fifth Amendment. 2 ' The force of Miranda should also exclude any
evidence uncovered as a result of the Government's use of the accused's
private statements which were elicited through means which deprived him
of an opportunity to exercise his privilege. The burden would fall upon the
prosecution to establish either that the defendant waived his privilege
knowingly and intelligently, or that the evidence would have been revealed
anyway. Obviously, the former is insurmountable; one who is without
knowledge of the investigation has no more opportunity to exercise his
rights than one who has no knowledge of their existence. Proof that
the evidence would have been uncovered regardless should be the only
choice open to the prosecution, and that will require some real maneu-
vering in many cases.
Evidence obtained at the end of a whip is no less voluntary than
that derived by insidious and subtle means where the oppor-
tunity to exercise the right against self-incrimination is absent.
Before a man can be compelled to testify against himself, he
must have a fair chance to exercise his right under the Fifth
Amendment. Where that fair chance is not afforded him, evi-
dence obtained in violation of his right is not only inadmissible
against him, but it is incapable of becoming the formulation for
the violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Free-
dom from unreasonable search would be a delusion indeed, if
evidence obtained through compulsory self-incrimination may
be used as a basis for violating that right.'24
he was talking in his sleep. Based on his self-incriminating answers the agents, without a
search warrant, entered the house and arrested him. The statements, together with private
papers found on Brock's person and in a dresser drawer, were admitted into evidence at
the trial which resulted in his conviction for violation of the Internal Revenue laws relating
to moonshine liquor. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding
that the statements and papers were constitutionally inadmissible because they were secured
in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
123. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921).
124. Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1955).
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The essence of the issue is also a well known axiom: substance over
form. The State should not be permitted to do indirectly that which the
Constitution prevents it from doing directly. The meaning of the privilege
implores the opportunity to exercise it, and the purpose of constitutional
safeguards is to assure that the Government cannot constructively defeat
that opportunity.
V. LEGISLATIVE SUBSTITUTES
Throughout the opinion in Miranda the Court declared that the
required warnings were "the procedural safeguards to be employed,
unless other fully effective means are devised.'112  Indeed, the Court
encouraged Congress and the states to adopt "a fully effective equiva-
lent. M 2
6
Notably, the opinion applauded the FBI for its adherence to the
required warnings system without any decay in effective law enforce-
ment.12' Furthermore, it seems that the requirements under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, imposed on federal agents if the evidence
is to be admissible, adequately provide for most of the warnings to be
given. But to the extent that the Rules do not provide for the "procedural
safeguards" now required, Congress should revise them accordingly
regardless of the FBI procedure now being employed. Particularly,
amendments may be necessary to encompass the "new" right that an
accused be continuously afforded an opportunity to exercise his rights, i.e.,
to discontinue the interrogation whenever he chooses, or to have an
attorney present in the alternative. This appears to be essential because
of the strong presumption against waiver which the Government will be
forced to rebut. Such proof will invariably require a revision of the Rules
to provide for recording and transcribing the interrogation proceedings,
unless formally waived by counsel for the accused, for although other
forms of corroboration might be suggested, recording seems most ap-
propriate. Otherwise, the burden of proof proving waiver may result in
blocking effective prosecution.
Most of the states will be forced to respond to the Court's ruling with
more detailed legislative enactments. It might be wise for state legislatures
125. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 64, at 1612. (Emphasis added.)
Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap
sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress
and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways
of protecting the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal
laws. Id. at 1624.
We have already pointed out that the Constitution does not require any specific
code of procedures for protecting the privilege against self incrimination during
custodial interrogation. Congress and the States are free to develop their own safe-
guards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as those described
above in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a
continuous opportunity to exercise it. Id. at 4537.
126. Id. at 1624, 1629.
127. Id. at 1632. See note 102 supra.
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to adopt the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, prepared by the
American Law Institute, when it is released in final form. Although it is
yet incomplete, the Code should soon be available in adoptable form,
especially in view of the Miranda decision which defines the required
procedures, some of which were missing in the original draft. Neverthe-
less, state legislatures should begin considering the Code or a suitable
substitute, to effectuate the required constitutional protections if depen-
dence upon vague court-made rules is to be avoided.
As last presented, the Code had provisions for most of the safeguards
required by the Miranda decision: the accused must be warned of his
right to silence promptly after arrest; he must be advised that he has a
right to call his attorney or family, and that they shall be permitted to see
him; he cannot be questioned for more than four hours at a time; and
notably, all interrogation must be recorded. This last provision assures
that any knowing and intelligent waiver will be able to be established
easily by the prosecution at trial, and conversely, will show an invalid
waiver. It also insures against secret interrogation. Furthermore, the Code
provides its own exclusionary rules for any testimony or evidence secured
in violation of its provisions, or resulting from procedures contrary to the
principles behind those provisions.
The Code should be modified to include required advice to the
accused that he has the right to have an attorney present during interroga-
tion. Also, as mentioned earlier, there should be provision that recording
of the interrogation period may be waived by an attorney representing
the accused. Moreover, some procedure for screening persons suspected
of crimes should be included, either in the Code or by specific state
legislation, in order to prevent unnecessary custodial time of innocent
persons who can be cleared without difficulty. 2 ' Such legislation, together
with more skilled and competent policemen governed by minimum law
enforcement training standards, also to be legislated,' 29 should more
adequately safeguard our constitutional rights and simultaneously per-
form the essential task of upgrading esteem and respect for local police
departments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Explication of the right to counsel in the American system of criminal
prosecution has matured. Clearly, the moving force behind its develop-
ment has been the assertion that the purpose of the right is to assure a
meaningful trial to one charged with a criminal offense. Too often the
purpose of the trial, i.e., the determination by a jury of one's innocence
or guilt with the burden of proof on the State, was reduced to a formal
hearing from which an accused could appeal his "admitted" guilt. Indeed,
128. See Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 118, at 69.
129. See note 121 supra.
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the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has little
protective value when there has been only a qualified opportunity to
exercise it.
Miranda begins with the basic premise that the privilege is an
individual's absolute right. Free choice contemplates that first one must
be given the opportunity to exercise it, and then he must be permitted
its intelligent exercise. The only effective assurance of such a choice to
an accused is his lawyer. Any activity on the part of the authorities which
impedes the operation of those rights is inherently coercive.
The major inquiry today, then, is to what limits can the privilege be
extended? In a single week the United States Supreme Court has told us
that it does extend to "communicative" police interrogation and investiga-
tion for the purpose of securing evidence in order to prosecute, but not to
compelled blood tests which are "non-communicative."'30 Is that distinc-
tion now to be our guide? Conceivably, counsel is required whenever
the privilege can constitutionally be exercised; does the right to counsel
attach automatically at the same instant?
The answers lie somewhere within the traditional conflict between
practical considerations for effective law enforcement and the personal
freedoms under which we live. Under the American system the methods
employed to establish his guilt are no less important than removing the
criminal from society. Nevertheless, superior law enforcement remains.
as the strongest deterrent to crime. But there is a mature and effective
compromise.
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that
no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes
to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdica-
tion through unawareness of their constitutional rights. . . .If
the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness
of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very
wrong with that system.'
130. See Schmerber v. California, supra note 114.
131. Justice Goldberg's opinion in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
